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Russo and Lyon: The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commi

THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF
THE COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION
Thomas A. Russo* and Edwin L. Lyon**
In 1974, Congress substantially amended the Commodity Exchange Act' (the Act), and created a new, independent federal
regulatory agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC). The congressional purpose was to remove the regulation
of commodities from the Department of Agriculture and place it
under the auspices of the CFTC. Interestingly, however, the most
controversial and ambiguous provision in the 1974 amendments
concerns the jurisdiction of the CFTC, and more specifically, the
parameters of its "exclusive jurisdiction." This exclusive jurisdiction
provision, section 2(a)(1) of the Act, states:
That the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is the character of . . . an 'option' . . .), and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract
market designated pursuant to Section 7 of this title or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market .... 2
Difficult questions have arisen as to the meaning of exclusive
jurisdiction as defined by the amendment. In addition, uncertainty
has arisen because Congress vested the CFTC with jurisdiction
over areas which had not been regulated by its predecessor, the
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA). This jurisdictional expan* Member, District of Columbia and New York Bars. B.A., 1965, Fordham University; M.B.A., 1969; J.D., 1969, Cornell University. Mr. Russo was formerly associated with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as Deputy General
Counsel and Director of the Division of Trading and Markets, and with the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the Division of Market Regulation.
** Member, District of Columbia and Missouri Bars. B.S., 1969, Southwest Missouri State University; J.D., 1972, Washington University. Mr. Lyon was formerly associated with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as Chief Counsel in the
Division of Trading and Markets, and with the Securities and Exchange Commission
in the Division of Market Regulation.
1. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88
Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (Supp. V 1975)).
2. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
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sion was accomplished by broadening the definition of the term
"'commodity" to include not only agricultural products but also "all
other goods and articles, except onions . . ., and all services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in ...."3
3. Id. Understanding the scope of the term "commodities" is important because
this scope defines the objects over which the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction. The critical issue is whether the phrase "in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in" modifies "all
other goods and articles ... and all services, rights, and interests," or only "all other
services, rights, and interests." A literal reading of the language of the definition is
not particularly helpful. The legislative history of § 2(a)(1) is more informative, however. For example, Senator Talmadge stated that "[a]ll goods, articles, services,
rights, and interests traded for future delivery are brought under Federal regulation"
by the amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act (the Act). STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON THE
COMMODITY FUTuRES TRADING COMMISSION AcT OF 1974, at 3 (Comm. Print 1974)

(statement of Senator Talmadge on Conference Report) [hereinafter cited as TALMADGE STATEMENT]. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5845. In addition, Dr. Clayton Yeutter,

Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, stated:
The bill would bring within the purview of the Act, in addition to the commodities now covered, all commodities, goods, articles, services, rights, and
interests which are or may be the subject of futures contracts. In other
words, the intent of this provision would be to cover all futures trading that
might now exist or might develop in the future.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1974). See also id. at 7-8: "Section 201 of
the Bill enlarges the definition of 'commodity' to include all goods and articles, except oniQns, and 'all services, rights and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.' "
Moreover, in § 16(a) of the Act, Congress provided that "[t]he Commission may
conduct regular investigations of the markets for goods, articles, services, rights, and
interests which are the subject of futures contracts .. " 7 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. V
1975). It would have been illogical for Congress to give the CFTC jurisdiction over
all "goods and articles," and then specify elsewhere in the Act that the Commission
could only investigate the markets for goods and articles which are the subject of
futures contracts. The CFTC has not announced an opinion as to the scope of the
term "commodity." However, at a May 6, 1977, American Bar Association panel discussion on "The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the CFTC," CFTC Acting Ceneral Counsel Richard Nathan asserted that the definition of "commodity" gave the CFTC
jurisdiction over all goods and articles and over those intangibles (services, rights,
and interests) on which futures contracts are traded. If this is the case, then the
CFTC's regulatory arm reaches even to toothpicks, towels, and tie tacks. There is
nothing in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments which hints that such
broad jurisdiction was intended, unless the good or article is somehow related to the
futures markets.
A second issue with respect to the scope of the "commodity" definition is the
meaning of the phrase "in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the
future dealt in." It is unclear whether this language pertains to contracts for future
delivery domestically or worldwide. The question would appear to be answered by
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The jurisdictional provisions of the Act were structured very
broadly to assure that there were no gaps in the regulation of commodities, commodity futures, and commodity options. 4 In addition,
the provisions attempted to avoid overlapping and conflicting regulation, such as that in the securities industry, 5 by authorizing a single agency to regulate commodities trading.
The effect of the expanded definition of the term "commodity," together with the exclusive jurisdiction provision, is to grant
the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over areas previously regulated by
state and federal agencies. For example, options on futures contracts, previously subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the state blue sky commissioners,
are now "exclusively regulated" by the CFTC. Thus, it was inevitable that the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC would produce
jurisdictional conflict. Since the amendments to the Act became
effective in 1975, the CFTC, the SEC, and the various state securities and commodities regulators have engaged in a running dialogue as to who can do what to whom.
This article sets forth some of the background against which
the "exclusive jurisdiction" provisions were drafted; describes the
jurisdictional dispute between the CFTC on the one hand, and the
SEC and state blue sky commissioners on the other, over the regulation of commodities trading; delineates specific jurisdictional issues relating to the various forms of commodities trading and
commodities trading professionals; and, finally, proposes a test for
resolving some of these jurisdictional issues.

referring to the provisions in the exclusive jurisdiction section which indicate that the

Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction "with respect to accounts, agreements
(including . . . 'option[s]' . . . ), and transactions involving contracts of sale of a

commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market. . . or any
other board of trade, exchange, or market .... " 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). The
legislative history of that provision indicates that the drafters of the 1974 amendments intended to give the Commission jurisdiction over futures contracts purchased
and sold in the United States but executed on a foreign board of trade, exchange, or
market. See TALMADGE STATEMENT, supra at 6. Congress must have intended the
modifying language of the commodities definition to mean commodities for future
delivery on any board of trade, whether domestic or foreign. Otherwise, there would
have been a "regulatory gap" with respect to those commodities not traded for future
delivery domestically but sold in the United States for future delivery on a foreign
board of trade or exchange.
4. See, e.g., TALMADGE STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 6-7; 120 CONG. REC.

34,736 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage).
5. See text accompanying notes 31-38 infra.
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I.

FACTORS LEADING TO AMENDMENT OF THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT

It is important to delineate the various factors which led to the
amendment of the Act in 1974 to understand the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction provision. In the late 1960's and early 1970's,
trading in futures of unregulated commodities increased substantially. For example, in 1970 a new exchange, the International
Monetary Market, was formed to provide a market for futures
transactions in various international currencies, including deutsche
marks, Japanese yen, Swiss francs, French francs, Canadian dollars,
Mexican pesos, Dutch guilders and pounds sterling. In addition,
volume on other exchanges in unregulated futures transactions in
silver, copper, platinum, palladium, crude oil, liquefied propane
gas, industrial fuel oil, heating oil, Belgian francs and Italian lire
increased. 6 There was much concern that persons trading in these
"unregulated" markets did not receive the same protection as persons trading either in the securities markets or in futures contracts
7
regulated by the CEA.
Perhaps the most important impetus for the extensive revision
of the Act was the perpetration of frauds upon investors by Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., 8 through the sale to the public of "naked"
options9 on unregulated commodities. In effect, the Goldstein, Samuelson operation was nothing more than a Ponzi scheme, in which
6. The Association of Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc. (since renamed the
Futures Industry Association Inc.), reported the following statistics regarding the
number of trades in both regulated and nonregulated commodities:
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
Total

Regulated
Contracts
Total
Nonregulated

18,285,377 14,345,711

7,541,370

3,986,344

11,810,383

11,547,271

9,345,191

2,752,948

2,075,336

1,861,494

Contracts
Total
Futures
25,826,747 18,332,055 14,563,331 13,622,607 11,206,685
Contracts
ASSOCIATION OF COMMODITY EXCHANGE FIRMS, INC., BULL. No. 1302-CNIMODrry FUTURES CONTRACTS TRADED, 1969-73, INCLUSIVE, reprinted in Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture on H.R. 11955, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 268-70
(1974).
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61-64 (1974).
8. Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., was a Los Angeles commodity option firm established by Harold Goldstein.
9. A commodity option is often defined as "naked" when the writer of the option does not own the underlying commodity or commodity futures contract.
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persons who purchased options that became profitable were paid
with money received from subsequent option purchasers. 10 As in
Ponzi schemes, the Goldstein, Samuelson incident led to substantial losses incurred by subsequent purchasers. It is estimated that
the amount of money lost by investors in the Goldstein, Samuelson
fraud was approximately $70 million."
The SEC and the state securities commissioners reacted to
this debacle predictably. Various states soon characterized commodity options as "securities" or adopted legislation which had that
effect.12 Some states distinguished "naked" options from covered
options, 13 while others simply deemed all commodity options securities. 14 The SEC indicated that it considered "naked" commod15
ity options to be securities.
A group of New York commodity option firms formed an association, the Commodity Exchange Member Firm Option Dealers
6
Association, to respond to this patchwork regulatory approach.'
This association had discussions with several state blue sky commissioners to encourage the states to enact legislation geared to commodity options. The association believed that placing the regulation
of commodity options under federal and state securities law was inappropriate, and that commodity options should be dealt with by
separate legislation. Although the group proposed federal legislation which provided for self-regulation of the commodity option industry under the oversight of the CEA, its efforts were unsuccessful.
The involvement of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) in the development of a futures market in mortgages also contributed to the creation of the exclusive jurisdiction
provision. In 1972, FHLMC prepared a detailed memorandum for
10.

A Ponzi scheme is impossible where a customer's money is segregated, be-

cause this money could not be used to pay prior purchasers.
11.
12.

H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974).
See, e.g., 1973 Cal. Stats. 1525.

13.

See, e.g., [1973] 208 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-4 to A-6.

14. See, e.g., Georgia Securities Commissioner's Release No. 1 (Sept. 18, 1973)
(on file at the offices of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Washington, D.C.).

15. See., e.g., Address by Hugh F. Owens, SEC Commissioner, NASAA Convention, San Antonio, Texas (Oct. 8, 1973), reprinted in [1973] 222 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) G-1; Brief for Appellee, In re Traders Int'l, Ltd., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,529 (D. Nev. 1974) (brief for SEC).
16. The association included Bache & Co., The Ore and Chemical Corp.,
Mocatta Metals Corp., Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., and Rudolf
Wolff & Co. Later, the name of the group was changed to the Commodity Options
Departments Association.
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the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance concerning the development of a mortgage futures market. 17 Essentially, the
FHLMC indicated that there was a need in the mortgage market
for a vehicle to hedge inventories in mortgages and mortgage
commitments. However, during the development of a futures market in mortgages, it became increasingly apparent to the FHLMC
that numerous problems with the federal securities laws would
arise because a mortgage futures contract would be considered a
security by the SEC. Indeed, the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance replied to the FHLMC memorandum, indicating that
these numerous problems with the federal securities laws could be
solved only by legislation.' 8 The initial discussions regarding the
development of extensive amendments to the Act provided the
FHLMC with a vehicle for solving these problems. The FHLMC
encouraged Congress to place the regulation of all futures trading
in a single agency.' 9
Finally, the existence of a group of companies which sold
"leverage" or "margin" contracts2 0 on gold and silver was instrumental in developing the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. After the
Goldstein, Samuelson scandal, these companies, like the commodity option dealers, found themselves subject to differing and sometimes conflicting securities regulation by the various states and by
the SEC. 2 i These companies also viewed amendment of the Act as
a means of resolving the problem of a multiplicity of regulatory
schemes; thus, they encouraged Congress to entrust the regulation
22
of all commodities trading to one agency.
Therefore, there were several independent forces urging Congress to vest an agency other than the SEC, or the state blue sky
17. Memorandum by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC)
(May 12, 1972) (on file at the offices of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York,
New York).
18. Memorandum by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 1972) (on
file at the offices of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York, New York).
19. See Letter from Thomas R. Bomar, Chairman, FHLMC, to Senator Herman
E. Talmadge, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry (May 20, 1974),
reprinted in Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R.
13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 665 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
20. "Leverage" or "margin" contracts on gold or silver are bulk gold or silver
or bags of coins sold on margin, delivery to be made only when full payment is
received.
21. See, e.g., [1974] 255 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12; [1974] 253 SEC. REG.
& L. REp. (BNA) A-2 to A-3.
22. See Senate Hearings,supra note 19, at 748-53 (statement of M. Martin Rom,
Chairman, International Precious Metals Corp.).
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commissioners, with exclusive jurisdiction over trading in commodity futures and commodities in general.2 3 The SEC, aware
that broad exclusive jurisdiction provisions were being drafted as
amendments to the Act, opposed these forces. Prior to the adoption of the amendments, the SEC reviewed the exclusive jurisdiction language; it was, however, dissatisfied with the language final24
ly adopted.
This dissatisfaction was demonstrated by events subsequent to
the passage of the 1974 amendments. Representative Harley 0.
Staggers, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, the SEC's oversight committee in the House, wrote
to Ray Garrett, Jr., then Chairman of the SEC, articulating his
concern that:
[b]ecause of the Act's broad definition of commodity, this grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the new Commission could apply both
to transactions on national securities exchanges which obtain designations as contract markets and to transactions in securities
structured to include a contract for future delivery on any other
board of trade, exchange or market (including a national se25
curities exchange).
After the passage of the 1974 amendments, Chairman Garrett recommended that the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 be amended
23. The commodity exchanges also advocated that futures trading regulation
be vested exclusively in one federal agency. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1974) (testimony of Frederick G. Uhlmann, Chairman,
Chicago Board of Trade).
24. Section 2(a)(1) provides:
except as hereinabove provided [the "exclusive jurisdiction" provision], nothing contained in this section shall (i) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at
any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission or other
regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or of any State, or
(ii) restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance
with such laws.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
25. Letter from Representative Harley 0. Staggers to Ray Garrett, Jr. (Nov. 20,
1974), reprinted in COMMODrrlES AND FUTURES TRADING 99, 100 (Practising Law
Institute 1975). For example, United States Treasury bonds are securities under the
definition of that term in the federal securities laws. However, because the 1974
amendments broadened the definition of "commodities" to include all "services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the
future dealt in," and because the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was designated as
a contract market to trade United States Treasury bonds futures, these bonds became
commodities as well as securities ("securities/commodities").
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970).
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to specify that the definition of "commodity" and the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC not be construed to limit the SEC's
jurisdiction.2 7 Subsequently, Chairman Garrett testified before the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, urging that limits be placed on the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction.2 At this time, Congress was consid29
ering substantial amendments to the federal securities laws.
Thus, in the 1975 legislation amending the securities laws, Congress had the opportunity to incorporate the SEC's suggestions
which opposed CFTC exclusive jurisdiction; however, it failed to
do so.
The fundamental intent of Congress is perhaps best summarized in the Conference Reports on the 1974 amendments to the
Act:
The House bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission over all futures transactions. However, it is provided that such exclusive jurisdiction would not supersede or
limit the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
or other regulatory authorities.
The Senate amendment retains the provision of the House
bill but adds three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amendments make clear that (a) the Commission's jurisdiction over futures contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and includes the regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading
agreements, and commodity options; (b) the Commission's jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes State as well as Federal
agencies ....30
II.

THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Act, the regulation of
commodities markets was shared by the CEA, the SEC, and various state regulatory agencies. Consequently, the "exclusive jurisdiction" provision of the amendments necessarily resulted in almost
immediate confusion and a fair measure of "turf-fighting."
27.

Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr., to Representative Harley 0. Staggers (Feb. 14,

1975), reprinted in Hearings on S.249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 209-11 (1975).
28. Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 204 (1975).
29. See id. at 197.
30. S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5894, 5897,
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A.

The CFTC vs. the SEC

Questions concerning the scope of the CFTC's jurisdiction as
it affected the SEC arose shortly after the CFTC began operation.
Trading in futures on mortgages became the focus of the issue. In
September 1975, the CFTC designated the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) as a contract market for futures trading in mortgage-backed
certificates guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). 31 Shortly thereafter, the SEC raised various
questions arising from jurisdictional overlap and conflict. 32 In response, the CFTC's Office of General Counsel prepared a memorandum regarding the scope of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction,
particularly as applied to mortgage futures. 3 3 The CFTC asserted
that futures trading in mortgages was not subject to the federal securities laws. 34 The SEC, however, argued that both regulatory
agencies appeared to have jurisdiction, since "contracts for future
31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Release No. 48-75 (Sept. 11,
1975) (on file at the offices of the CFTC, Washington, D.C.). GNMA certificates are
mortgage-backed instruments supported by the full faith or credit of the United
States as to the timely payment of principal and interest. The GNMA security is an
"exempted security" as that term is defined in the federal securities laws. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
32. Letter of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, SEC (Nov. 13, 1975), reprinted in
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,117.
33. Memorandum of the Office of the General Counsel of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Concerning the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commission
over Futures Transactions, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,117, at 20,831 (Dec. 3, 1975) [hereinafter cited as CFTC Memorandum]. This
memorandum provides an extensive review of the legislative history of the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of the 1974 amendments as it relates to the regulation of commodity futures trading. This legislative history indicates that the drafters of the 1974
amendments contemplated futures trading in mortgages. The House Report on the
proposed legislation noted:
Exchange and other knowledgeable officials stated that new contract markets were planned to be established in the near future in such areas as
ocean freight rates, mortgages, and possibly petroleum products.
With the number of nonregulated futures contracts traded being a significant percentage of the total futures market, and with the planned establishment of additional futures markets, we believe that it is vital that these
commodities and services be regulated in order to protect the public and to
instill confidence in the market.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1974), quoted in CFTC Memorandum,
supra at 20,832. The Senate Report similarly stated: "[T]ransactions in ... government securities or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments would not be subject to the [Commodity Exchange] Act unless they involve the sale thereof for future
delivery conducted on a board of trade." S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5870, quoted in CFTC
Memorandum, supra at 20,832.
34. CFTC Memorandum, supra note 33, at 20,831-32.
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delivery of [GNMA] securities are also 'securities.' "35 Nonetheless, trading in GNMA futures on the CBOT began on schedule
36
without interference from the SEC.
Finally, the SEC and the CFTC established an informal liaison
to discuss jurisdictional conflict. The agencies agreed to cooperate
in litigation and on other matters in which jurisdictional issues
were raised, because the SEC and the CFTC shared the goal of
protecting the public.3 7 However, no lasting agreement on jurisdictional conflict has been reached, and the CFTC has continued to
stress the exclusivity of its jurisdiction. While the CFTC maintains
posia cooperative attitude, it has never lost sight of the original
38
tion enunciated in its exclusive jurisdiction position paper.
B.

The CFTC vs. State Regulation

The Federal Preemption Doctrine
As discussed above, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
accounts, agreements (including options), transactions involving a
futures contract, 3 9 and gold and silver leverage contracts covered
35. Letter of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, SEC (Nov. 13, 1975), reprinted in
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,117, at 20,829.
36. Subsequent to trading GNMA futures on the CBOT, the CFTC designated
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange as a market in 90-day Treasury bills. CFTC Release No. 92-75 (Nov. 26, 1975) (on file at the offices of the CFTC, Washington,
D.C.). It also designated the CBOT as a contract market in commercial paper loans
and in Treasury bonds. CFTC Release No. 311-77 (July 12, 1977) (on file at the
offices of the CFTC, Washington, D.C.); CFTC Release No. 323-77 (Aug. 2, 1977)
(on file at the offices of the CFTC, Washington, D.C.).
37. As early as 1974, reference to such anticipated cooperation appeared in Representative Poage's comments:
To the extent that the language of [amended § 2(a)(1)J subjects rights
and interests or transactions involving rights and interests to the concurrent
jurisdiction of the new Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the conferees intended that the two
Commissions would consult and cooperate in determining what approaches
to the exercise of their respective jurisdictions will best serve the public
interest.
120 CONG. REc. 34,737 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage). See also Letter of Roderick
M. Hills, Chairman, SEC (Nov. 13, 1975), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,117, at 20,831.
38. CFTC Memorandum, supra note 33.
39. The Senate Conference Report stated:
Under the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the Commission, the authority in
the Commodity Exchange Act... would preempt the field insofar as futures
regulation is concerned. Therefore, if any substantive State law regulating
futures trading was contrary to or inconsistent with Federal law, the Federal
law would govern. In view of the broad grant of authority to the Commis-
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by section 217 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974.40 However, an analysis of the extent to which the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, supersedes state securities laws
must consider not only the exclusive jurisdiction provision, but also
the federal preemption doctrine. It is insufficient merely to conclude that a particular area of regulation falls outside the parameters of exclusive jurisdiction if, in fact, federal regulation of that
area is pervasive.
Prior to the adoption of the 1974 amendments, courts had
construed the Act as not totally preempting state regulation of futures trading. In Rice v. Board of Trade,41 plaintiff claimed that
various rules of the CBOT were unreasonable and that they should
have been approved by a state commission as required by Illinois
law. At issue was whether the Act superseded Illinois law.
At that time, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture over
the rules of commodity exchanges was more limited than the
CFTC's authority. With respect to the CBOT rules at issue in
Rice, the Court stated that "while there is provision in some instances for disapproval of the Board's rules by the Secretary of Agriculture . . ., there is no provision for his approval or disapproval
of the rules challenged in the Illinois proceeding." 4 2 In addition,
section 4c of the Act 4 3 contained a provision stating: "Nothing in
this section or section 6b of this title shall be construed to impair
any State law applicable to any transaction enumerated or described in such sections." 44 In view of this provision, the Supreme
Court in Rice stated: "Where Congress used such care to preserve
specific state authority, even when it duplicated federal regulation,
it is a fair inference not only that supersedure was to take its
natural course where rights not saved to the States were involved
. . . but also that non-conflicting state authority was left undisturbed." 4 5 The Court noted that the Act's authorization of the
Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate with the states "support[ed]
sion to regulate the futures trading industry, the Conferees do not contemplate that there will be a need for any supplementary regulation by the
States.
S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1974).
40. 7 U.S.C § 15a (Supp. V 1975).
41. 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
42. Id. at 254.
43. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970).
44. Id. This provision was deleted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 402(d), 88 Stat. 1389 (amending 7 U.S.C. §
6c (1970)).
45. Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247, 255 (1947) (citation omitted).
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the inference that Congress did not design a regulatory system
which excluded state regulation not in conflict with the federal
requirements." 4 6
Essentially, the Supreme Court in Rice held that the Act did
not preempt state regulation. The 1974 amendments, however, deleted the reference to continuing state jurisdiction in section 4c
and granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, Congress
overruled Rice at least within the four corners of the grant of exclu47
sive jurisdiction in section 2(a)(1).
Nevertheless, the states may have limited overlapping jurisdiction with the CFTC in commodities regulation. 48 Concurrent jurisdiction would, however, be subject to the federal preemption doctrine. Thus, an analysis of a recent case, Great Western United
Corp. v. Kidwell,49 is helpful in applying the preemption doctrine
to commodities regulation.
In Great Western the District Court for the Northern District
of Texas struck down an Idaho statute regulating cash tender offers,

holding that the statute was preempted by the Williams Act.50 The
46. Id.
47. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). The language in § 4c, 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970), was
deleted at the request of Senator Curtis of Nebraska. On the floor of the Senate,
Senator Curtis stated:
Mr. President, I understand that the intent of the bill is to grant exclusive
jurisdiction over commodity futures trading to the new Commission, except
to the extent the bill specifies that other Federal and State agencies and
Federal and State courts are to retain jurisdiction. However, as I understand
it, it is also the intent of the bill that, even in the cases where the State
agencies and State courts retain jurisdiction, the Federal substantive law
embodied in the Commodity Exchange Act as amended by the bill would
preempt the field completely, so that if any substantial State law were contrary to or inconsistent with Federal law, the Federal law would govern.
Section 4c of the existing Commodity Exchange Act contains the following sentence:
"Nothing in this section or section 4b shall be construed to impair any
State law applicable to any transaction enumerated or described in such sections."
All of the transactions referred to in that sentence are covered by the
existing act as amended by the bill. In order to assure that Federal preemption is complete, I believe that the sentence I quoted should be deleted
from the act.
120 CONG. REc. 30,464 (1974) (remarks of Senator Curtis). Senator Talmadge stated:
"Mr. President, I have studied the amendment of the distinguished Senator from
Nebraska. I agree with its import. I urge the Senate to adopt it." Id. (remarks of
Senator Talmadge).
48. See text accompanying notes 52-63 infra.
49. [1977] 419 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) M-1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1977).
50. The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 as an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), amending 15 U.S.C.
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court discussed the doctrine of preemption:
In order to effect the Supremacy Clause, the courts have developed the doctrine of federal preemption....
First, a state statute is preempted if it is apparent from federal statutes, their legislative histories, or the pervasiveness of
the federal regulatory scheme that Congress intended to occupy
the field and displace state regulations. Second, a state statute is
preempted if it affects a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant as to preclude state laws regulating the same subject.
Finally, a state statute is preempted if it conflicts with the federal law to such an extent as to51 be an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal scheme.
When the preemption analysis of Great Western is applied to
the area of commodities law not covered by the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Act, there appears to be little room for state
regulation of registrants. Congressional concern with conflicting
state regulation, the pervasive regulatory scheme established by
the Act, statements by members of Congress and others that they
envisioned little need for supplemental state regulation, and the
specific removal of the "saving" language of section 4c suggest that
Congress intended pervasive federal regulation. Certainly where a
particular area of regulation is specifically covered by the CFTC,
any state regulation which contradicts the CFTC's decision would
be invalid under the preemption doctrine. Moreover, it is arguable
that even if there are gaps in the CFTC's regulatory program permitting supplemental state regulation, federal preemption nevertheless applies where the CFTC specifically declines to implement
§§ 78m-78n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. V 19651969)), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
51. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, [1977] 419 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
M-l, M-7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1977). See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), where the court stated:
Key factors in the determination of whether Congress has, by implication,
preempted a particular area so as to preclude state attempts at dual regulation include, inter alia: (1) the aim and intent of Congress as revealed by
the statute itself and its legislative history . . . (2) the pervasiveness of the
federal regulatory scheme as authorized and directed by the legislation and
as carried into effect by the federal administrative agency ... (3) the nature
of the subject matter regulated and whether it is one which demands "exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national
interests" . . . and ultimately (4) "whether, under the circumstances of [a]
particular case [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Id. at 1146-47 (citations omitted).
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an aspect of this state regulation. For example, where the CFTC
determines implementation of a regulation would place an undue
burden on the registrant and the industry, state regulation which
contradicts the CFTC decision not to regulate would be invalid. To
resolve preemption questions in future litigation, the CFTC should
enunciate its position in the Federal Register when adopting rules
which fall within the CFTC's jurisdiction, but are outside the scope
of the grant of exclusive jurisdiction.
The States' Regulatory Role
The question of the states' role in the regulation of the commodities industry also arose shortly after the 1974 amendments became effective. In a speech before the North American Securities
Administrators Conference, CFTC Vice Chairman John V.Rainbolt,
II emphasized the congressional concern with the patchwork statefederal regulation of commodities which had led to the exclusive
jurisdiction provision. Commissioner Rainbolt concluded:
[1]t is clear, beyond any reasonable dispute, that the Act totally
preempts any state licensing or registration provisions. Further
...it is clear that any form of state regulation, as such, of any
persons, entities or activities affecting or involving trading in
commodity futures contracts, the sale of gold and silver coin and
bullion on margin, or commodity options would be inconsistent
with the pervasive regulatory scheme established by Congress.
Today, state regulation of any sort would be preempted under
52
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution.
The Vice Chairman acknowledged that the states retained some
regulatory authority over the commodities industry because (1) the
states were not preempted from prosecuting under general state
antifraud statutes 53 and (2) the states could sue as parens pa52. Address by John V. Rainbolt, II, North American Securities Administrators
Conference (Sept. 9, 1975), reprintedin [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,075, at 20,706-07.
53. Id. at 20,707. Vice Chairman Rainbolt stated, however, that state antifraud
statutes "must be of general application and . . . not part of some narrower state
regulatory scheme." Id. See also S. lp. No. 73, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1975):
"[The CFTC Act] does not prevent the States from enforcing their criminal antifraud statutes."; Memorandum Prepared by the CFTC's Office of General Counsel to
All State Securities Administrators (Oct. 8, 1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CohM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,218, at 21,187: "It would be anomalous, however, if the
states were found powerless to prevent behavior which, if consummated, would violate their criminal laws; and it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress could have
intended such a result." This memorandum noted, however, that "[a]ctivities permit-
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triae54 to enjoin fraud or other violations of the Act or the regulations thereunder. 55 The Vice Chairman encouraged states to
cooperate with the CFTC in enforcing the CFTC's regulations, and
promised that the CFTC would "conduct regional meetings to
56
promote and coordinate this cooperative enforcement program."
Furthermore, the CFTC proposed a model state statute which
would authorize a state securities commissioner to sue as parens
patriae,57 either to enjoin business activities within the state which
58
violate the Act, or to enforce compliance with the Act.
Various state blue sky commissioners have indicated to the
CFTC that enforcement of state antifraud statutes or use of the
parens patriae concept are impractical alternatives. State officials
are reluctant to proceed under general antifraud statutes or as parens patriae because proof of fraud or of the validity of a parens
patriae suit is extremely time- and resource-consuming. Instead,
they prefer to proceed under the more specific state broker/dealer
registration requirements or blue sky provisions. Indeed, the Central Securities Administrators Council proposed extensive regulatory guidelines for commodity pool programs. 59 To date, no state
ted under the federal act or by federal regulation may not be impeded through an
unreasonably broad interpretation of what might constitute fraud under state law."
Id.
54. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state sues for the benefit of its
citizens.
55. Address by John V. Rainbolt, II, North American Securities Administrators
Conference (Sept. 9, 1975), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,075, at 20,707. See Memorandum Prepared by the CFTC's Office of
General Counsel to All State Securities Administrators (Oct. 8, 1976), [1975-1977
Transfer Binder] COMM. FTrr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,218, at 21,187.
56. Address by John V. Rainbolt, II, North American Securities Administrators
Conference (Sept. 9, 1975), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,075, at 20,707. In an attempt to foster a cooperative state-federal
regulatory effort, an Advisory Committee on State Jurisdiction and Responsibilities
under the Act was formed to act as liaison organization between CFTC and state
officials on matters of joint concern. See 41 Fed. Reg. 13,393 (1976). In September
1977, John G. Gaine, the new CFTC General Counsel, William A. Briggs, and Stanley J. Aronoff, were added as members of the Advisory Committee. COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) REPORT LETTER No. 57 at 4 (Sept. 27, 1977).
57. While a statute is unnecessary to authorize a state to sue under the doctrine of parens patriae, the drafters of the model statute believed that statutory authorization would provide additional encouragement to the states to regulate commodities through parens patriae suits.
58. See Memorandum Prepared by the CFTC's Office of General Counsel to All
State Securities Administrators (Oct. 8, 1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuTr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,218, at 21,191.
59. Central Securities Administrators Council, Proposed Guidelines for the Registration of Commodity Pool Programs (Nov. 8, 1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
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has adopted a statute, such as that suggested by the CFTC, which
authorizes its securities administrator to proceed as parens patriae
to enforce the Act. The states' reluctance to use the parens patriae
theory to assist in enforcing the Act and its regulations is of concern to the CFTC. Because of the CFTC's limited manpower, it
has been unable fully to police commodity-related trading nationwide.
There are two alternatives to merely encouraging states to
pursue causes of action on behalf of their citizens. The most obvious alternative is to amend the Act to include a provision similar to
section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,60 which permits
states to adopt securities regulations insofar as they do "not conflict
with the provisions" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its
regulations. However, such a provision would be contrary to the
congressional aim of preventing overlapping regulations"1 and is not,
therefore, a realistic alternative.
Another perhaps more practical approach in view of the congressional intent is to amend the Act to contain a provision similar
to newly enacted section 4C(a) of the Clayton Act. 6 2 This provision
establishes a cause of action for the states on behalf of their citizens
in the antitrust area. 63 The advantage of amending the Act to
create explicitly a similar parens patriae cause of action is that this
amendment would both apply the doctrine to the Act and provide
congressional impetus to the states to pursue violations of the Act
and its regulations.
III.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES RAISED

BY EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

As noted, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC produces jurisdictional conflict between the CFTC on the one hand,
CoMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,244. These proposals contain a registration provision, suitability requirements for both the operator and participants, disclosure and
minimum financial standards, and prospectus requirements. See text accompanying
note 81 infra.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. V 1975).
61. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
62. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 301, Pub. L. No.
94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1970)).
63. This amendment to the Clayton Act overruled Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), which had held that the Clayton Act does not authorize a
state to sue for injuries to the general economy which are attributable to antitrust
violations. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
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and the SEC and the states on the other. Areas of regulation formerly within the purview of the SEC or the states have now become subject, with varying degrees of clarity, to the jurisdiction of
the CFTC. In the past there has been conflicting regulation and
uncertainty resulting from the diffuse jurisdiction over commodities. However, the exclusive jurisdiction provision has not totally
resolved the uncertainty. To understand this problem, it is necessary to examine the major areas of regulatory conflict. Then, a test
to resolve this uncertainty will be proposed.
A.

Commodity Options

Section 2(a)(1) of the Act states that the CFTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the trading of options which involve any commodity for future delivery on a contract market, or other board of
trade, exchange, or market. 64 In addition, section 4c(b) of the Act
gives the CFTC broad power to determine whether, and under
what conditions, options on commodities are to be traded, including options involving the commodity itself and options involving
futures in that commodity. This section provides in part:
No person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the
execution of, any transaction . . .involving any commodity ...
not specifically set forth in section 2 of this [Act] . . .which is of

the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an 'option' . . . contrary to any rule, regulation or order of the Commission prohibiting any such transaction . . .under such terms
65
and conditions as the Commission may prescribe ....

This broad and apparently clear grant of authority is obscured
by its legislative history, at least as applied to options on securities
which also come within the definition of "commodity" (securities/
commodities). 66 The Senate Report stated: -[T]he Commission
would not have the authority to regulate trading in puts and calls
for securities. Where traded on exchanges, the puts and calls are
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Where
64. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). In addition to the obvious statutory resolution
of this issue, the nexus between the regulatory problems regarding the trading of the
option and the underlying future, including exercise and delivery questions, requires
a single regulatory structure.
65. Id. § 6c(b). Section 4c(a)(B) of the Act provides that options on the commodities specifically listed in § 2(a)(1) are prohibited. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(B) (Supp. V
1975).
66. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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traded among banks, they are regulated by the bank regulatory
agencies."67
The drafters of the amendments did not want the CFTC to
become involved in regulating the traditional securities option exchanges or markets. However, the language of section 4c(b), on its
face, gives the CFTC jurisdiction over all options which involve
any commodity, without restriction as to whether the option
pertains to a futures contract or a commodity which is also a security. 68 One theoretical problem which could result from this broad
authority is that the CFTC could inadvertently disrupt existing
securities options markets by banning, restricting, or conditioning
the trading of commodity options without regard to whether the
underlying commodity is also a security.
As a practical matter, however, this problem may be resolved
by section 2(a)(1):
Nothing in this [Act] shall be deemed to govern or in any
way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security
warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts,
repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and
mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board
of trade. 69
The CFTC's Office of General Counsel stated in its memorandum
to the SEC regarding exclusive jurisdiction that this provision iwas
intended to make clear that the CFTC would not have any jurisdic67. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 5843, 5866.
68. In its Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the
House Conference Report articulated the broad scope of the CFTC's authority with
respect to commodity options:
The House bill continues the ban now contained in section 4c of the Act
on trading in options (privileges, indemnities, bids, offers, puts, calls, ad-

vance guaranties, and decline guaranties) in the now-regulated commodities,
but permits trading in options in all other commodities if not done contrary
to any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any such
transaction or allowing any such transaction under such terms and conditions as the Commission may prescribe. The Commission could promulgate
such an order, rule, or regulation only after notice and opportunity for hearing. The Commission may set different terms and conditions for different
markets.
H.R. REp. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 5894, 5901. This aspect of the House bill was adopted without change. See
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION ACT OF 1974, at 5

(Comm. Print 1974).
69. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
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tion with respect to the purchase and sale of the enumerated financial instruments themselves (the 'cash market'), but would have
jurisdiction solely with respect to futures trading in those instruments." 70 Thus, section 2(a)(1) of the Act could be interpreted to
exclude the CFTC from securities options markets, even though
a literal reading of section 4c(b) appears to vest the CFTC with
jurisdiction over all options involving commodities, including "securities/commodities."
The conflict between the CFTC and the states in the commodity options area is illustrated by CFTC Interpretative Letter No.
76-19.71 In this letter, the CFTC's Office of General Counsel reasserted the exclusivity of CFTC jurisdiction as applied to state regulation of commodity options. With respect to the Indiana Securities
Commissioner's attempt to regulate commodity options under the
state's securities laws, the letter stated: "It is our view ... that the
Indiana securities laws and the regulations adopted thereunder
have been preempted insofar as they seek to regulate commodity
option transactions. Consequently, we cannot believe that [XYZ]
Industries, Inc. is obligated to register as a broker-dealer under
72
the securities laws of Indiana."
73

B. Commodity Trading Advisors
CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-2074 discussed the preemption of state regulation of commodity trading advisors. The Office
70. CFTC Memorandum, supra note 33, at 20,834.
71. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 20,213 (Sept. 29,
1976).
72. Id. at 21,160.
73. A commodity trading advisor is statutorily defined as:
any person who, for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the
value of commodities or as to the advisability of trading in any commodity
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market, or who
for compensation or profit, and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning commodities; but does not include
(i) any bank or trust company, (ii) any newspaper reporter, newspaper columnist, newspaper editor, lawyer, accountant, or teacher, (iii) any floor
broker or futures commission merchant, (iv) the publisher of any bona fide
newspaper, news magazine, or business or financial publication of general
and regular circulation including their employees, (v) any contract market,
and (vi) such other persons not within the intent of this definition as the
Commission may specify by rule, regulation, or order: Provided, That the
furnishing of such services by the foregoing persons is solely incidental to
the conduct of their business or profession.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
74. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 20,214 (Sept.
29, 1976).
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of General Counsel stated:
[I]t would be inconsistent with the overriding Congressional desire to establish uniform national regulation in this area to allow
any supplementary regulation by states. It is our view, therefore, that the California Commodity Law and the regulations
adopted thereunder may not constitutionally be enforced insofar
as they seek to regulate the activities of commodity trading advisors or other persons subject to the Commission's exclusive
regulatory scheme of the Comjurisdiction under the pervasive
75
Act.
Exchange
[sic]
modities
On February 15, 1977, the CFTC proposed a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for commodity trading advisors. 7 6 If this regulatory package is adopted, the federal regulation for trading advisors would include: registration, including an investigation into
the background of the applicant; disclosure of a trading advisor's
futures position; an antifraud provision; recordkeeping and reporting requirements; advertising restrictions; and certain disclosure
requirements. 77 This proposal would yield a pervasive regulatory
scheme: The states could do little which would not either duplicate
or conflict with federal requirements. Congress intended to eliminate such duplication and conflict through the 1974 amendments.

C. Commodity Pool Operators8
On February 15, 1977, the CFTC published its proposed regulations for commodity pool operators. 79 The Commission's posi75. Id. at 21,162.
76. 42 Fed. Reg. 9278 (1977).
77. Id.
78. A commodity pool consists of a group of persons who "pool" their money to
trade commodity futures contracts. The most common form of commodity pool is the
limited partnership where the limited partners provide the funds for trading and the
general partner "operates" the pool. These limited partnership interests are considered securities requiring registration under the Securities Act of 1933, and under
the comparable state blue sky laws. See SEC Opinion Letter re Thomas Beard, [19751977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,279 (Nov. 30, 1976). A commodity pool operator is statutorily defined as:
any person engaged in a business which is of the nature of an investment
trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solcits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or property,
either directly or through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other
forms of securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market, but
does not include such persons not within the intent of this definition as the
Commission may specify by rule or regulation or by order.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
79. 42 Fed. Reg. 9266 (1977).
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tion on its exclusive jurisdiction in this area was set forth in the
FederalRegister notice accompanying these proposals:
The activities of commodity pool operatQrs necessarily concern
accounts, agreements and transactions involving futures contracts
[over which section 2(a)(1) of the Act gives the CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction]. In addition, Congress has granted the Commission
pervasive authority under Sections 41, 4m, 4n, 4o and 8a of the
Act, to register and otherwise to regulate the activities of commodity pool operators.
Notwithstanding this congressional intent, the Commission
understands that there remain among the laws of several of the
states provisions which purport to regulate pool operator activities. But one of the major reasons that prompted Congress to
amend the Act in 1974 was to avoid overlapping and duplicative
regulation, which might result from the application of diverse
and often conflicting laws of the various states ....
In view of this Congressional purpose, and the unambiguous
language of the Act, as amended, there is no basis in law for any
supplementary regulation by the states of the activities of commodity pool operators except, to the extent that pool operators
also engage in securities-activities subject to the jurisdiction of
the state regulatory authorities. 8 0
Subsequent to the publication of its proposed regulations, the
CFTC's Office of General Counsel discussed the guidelines for
commodity pool programs proposed by the Central Securities Administrators Council:81 "We note that several aspects of the
Council's proposed guidelines appear to regulate the activities of
commodity pool operators. We believe, however, that the states
have been preempted from imposing regulatory requirements on
commodity pool operators through adoption of the Council's
82
guidelines or otherwise."
The CFTC has consistently stated that its exclusive jurisdiction
over accounts, agreements, and transactions involving commodity
futures contracts preempts state regulation of commodity pools.
However, it has not taken a position on the exclusivity of its jurisdiction over the capital formation of commodity pools. When asked
whether section 2(a)(1) precludes the necessity of registration under
80.
81.
Larson,
FUT. L.
82.

Id. at 9270 n.14.
Letter from Richard Nathan, CFTC Deputy General Counsel, to John R.
Minnesota Commissioner of Securities (July 5, 1977), reprinted in CoMM.
REP. (CCH) 20,445.
Id. at 21,808.
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section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 or similar state securities
laws, the CFTC's Office of General Counsel declined to take a position. In an Interpretative Letter,8 3 the Office of General Counsel
stated:
It is apparently the view of the Securities and Exchange Commission and some state regulatory agencies . . . that the or-

ganizational stage of commodity pools concerns only "capital
formation" which may and should be separately considered from
regulation applicable to the conduct of the pool's trading activity.
.. .Of course, the concept of "capital formation" arises under,
and has specific relevance to, securities laws; it is a concept having no necessary relevance to the Commodity Exchange Act or
to the proper interpretation of the exclusive jurisdiction provision that Act contains . .

.

. [R]elationships between commodity

trading pools and their participants are, from their inception,
quite literally, "accounts, agreements . . . [or] transactions in-

volving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery ...."
On this basis it would not be surprising, in view of the intended
breadth and remedial purpose of the exclusive jurisdiction provision, if the courts should ultimately hold that this Commission's exclusive jurisdiction encompasses all matters "touching"
84
upon commodity futures.
Although the Office of General Counsel declined to take a position regarding the exclusivity of the Commission's jurisdiction
over commodity pools which also fall within the definition of "investment contracts," it has expressed its opinion on exclusive jurisdiction over discretionary commodity trading accounts, which have
been held by some courts to be "investment contracts." 85 The
rationale with respect to exclusive jurisdiction should be the same
86
for commodity pools and discretionary accounts.
D.

DiscretionaryCommodity Accounts

Another form of trading vehicle for commodity speculators is
the discretionary commodity account. In these accounts, a speculator gives a power of attorney to his broker or to a commodity
83. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-14, COMM. FrT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,486
(Sept. 16, 1977).
84. Id.
85. See text accompanying notes 87-99 infra.
86. For a further discussion of commodity pools, see Saitlin, Commodity Pools,
in COMMODITIES AND FUTuREs TRADING 1977 (Practising Law Institute 1977).
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trading advisor to make all trading decisions with respect to the
account. Frequently, these discretionary accounts are part of what
brokerage houses call their "managed account programs," whereby
the customer gives the brokerage house or an associated person
discretion to trade his account pursuant to a special, usually computerized, trading program. In these managed account programs,
each customer maintains an individual account with the brokerage
house, and that account is traded pursuant to the buy-sell signals
indicated by the trading program.
Prior to the adoption of the 1974 amendments, these discretionary accounts and managed account programs had been characterized by many courts as "investment contracts" and thereby
securities under the Securities Act of 1933.87 Other courts, however, had held that discretionary commodity accounts and managed
account programs were not investment contracts because they did
not meet the "common enterprise" test set forth in SEC v. Howey
Co. 8 8 For example, in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,89 the
district court held that a discretionary account is a security, but that the issuance of a number of discretionary accounts
does not constitute a public offering and is therefore exempted
from registration by the private offering exemption of section 4(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933.90 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
modified the lower court decision, holding that a discretionary
commodity account does not constitute a security, but merely establishes an agency relationship. 91 In SEC v. Continental Commodity Corp.,92 the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. The
court in Continental deemphasized the importance of the "common
enterprise" element set forth in Howey, rejecting "the proposition
that the pro rata sharing of profits is critical to a finding of
commonality." 93 The court stated that "the critical inquiry is con-

87. See, e.g., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th

Cir. 1970); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Minn.
1968); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
88. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Court in SEC v. Howey Co., id., articulated a
"common enterprise" test, stating: "The test [for determining if an investment contract is present] is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Id. at 301.
89. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
90. See id. at 276-79 (quoting Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp.
1149 (N.D. Ill. 1970)).
91. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d at 279.
92. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
93. Id. at 552.
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fined to whether the fortuity of the investment collectively is essentially dependent upon promoter expertise." 9 4
In two more recent cases, Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 9 5 and Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 96
the courts refused to follow Continental; they held that there must
be a pooling of funds or a pro rata distribution of profits to possess
the "common enterprise" element necessary to establish an investment contract under the Howey test. In Curran plaintiff
opened accounts in the defendant's "Specialized, Guided, Account
Trading Program" in which plaintiff agreed to participate for at
least eighteen months, and in which "Defendant made all trading
decisions and exercised complete control over Plaintiffs' accounts
with complete reliance by Plaintiffs upon Defendants' actions and
decisions." 97 After reviewing these facts, the court concluded that
it was
unable to perceive how this sort of arrangement can be held to
involve a common enterprise, regardless of how many other customers' accounts were being handled by defendant under similar
C
arrangements.
...[Therefore] no security was involved since there was no
"investment contract" as that term has been construed by the
Supreme Court in the Howey case. 9 8
These cases established the law with respect to discretionary
commodity accounts prior to the enactment of the 1974 amendments. The CFTC's Office of General Counsel has asserted that
section 2(a)(1) of the Act gives the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over
discretionary commodity trading accounts such as those involved in
Milnarik, Continental, Curran, and Hirk. The Commission stated
that section 2(a)(1) of the Act vests the CFTC with "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements and transactions
involving commodity futures contracts, both discretionary and
nondiscretionary, and that the exclusivity of its jurisdiction is not
affected by whether the account, agreement or transaction might
otherwise be viewed as a 'security.' -99
94.

Id.

95. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,276 (E.D,
Mich. 1976).
96. [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 19,167 (7th Cir. 1977).
97. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,276, at 21,504 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
98. Id. at 21,507.
99. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-2, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Cozm.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,257, at 21,371 (Jan. 14, 1977).
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E.

Gold and Silver Margin Transactions
-Leverage Contracts

The 1974 amendments gave the CFTC broad authority over
transactions "for the delivery of silver bullion, gold bullion, or bulk
silver coins or bulk gold coins, pursuant to a standardized contract
commonly known to the trade as a margin account, margin contract, leverage account, or leverage contract ...."100 Under section
2(a)(1) of the Act, the CFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction over
"transactions subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant
to
Section 217 .... -. 101 Under this exclusive jurisdiction provision,
all regulation by the states and federal agencies of gold
and silver margin transactions covered by section 217 is pre10 2
empted.
In correspondence relating to state litigation concerning transactions in gold and silver leverage contracts, the CFTC's Office of
General Counsel stated that "no person may now be enjoined to
comply with any regulations concerning Section 217 transactions
other than those which the Commodity Futures Trading Commis03
sion may adopt."'
F. GNMA Market
The development of the GNMA' 0 4 futures market highlights
the jurisdictional conflict between securities laws and CFTC exclusive jurisdiction under section 2(a)(1) of the Act. Without section
2(a)(1), the GNMA futures market would most likely fall within the
scope of securities laws. Moreover, the proper treatment of GNMA
commitments for jurisdictional purposes is unclear.
CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-11105 discussed whether
100.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, § 217a, 7 U.S.C.

§ 15a (Supp. V 1975).
101. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). Section 217 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 is codified at 7 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1975).
102. See S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1974) (Conference Report): "[T]he Senate amendment provides that the Commission's authority in section
217 of the bill to regulate transactions for the delivery of silver bullion, gold bullion,
or bulk silver coins or bulk gold coins pursuant to standardized margin or leverage

contracts is exclusive.
"The Conference substitute adopts the Senate amendment ...
103. Letter from CFTC, Office of General Counsel to Charles S. Zimmerman
(Jan. 9, and Jan. 21, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT.L.
REP. (CCH) 20,134, at 20,905.
104. Government National Mortgage Association.
105. Comm.FUr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,466 (Aug. 17, 1977).
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the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over certain transactions
by a dealer in GNMA securities. The CFTC stated:
As we understand the relevant facts, ABC Corporation is a
dealer in United States Government securities. It purchases
GNMAs from underwriters, who are members of the GNMA
Mortgage Backed Securities Dealers Association. It resells the
GNMAs to its customers at a markup. These transactions are
usually handled on a one business day settlement basis, with the
seller's GNMA delivered to a bank against payment by the customer. It appears, however, that payment, and hence delivery,
may occur up to 180 days after the date of the agreement with
the company's customer, that this deferred delivery is the usual
course of business and that delivery on other than a deferred
basis is a rare exception."' °
This discussion raised, without answering, whether the GNMA
Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association was a "board of
trade" which must be designated as a contract market. 107
In a separate Interpretative Letter issued simultaneously, the
CFTC responded to the related question of whether transactions

in the GNMA forward commitment market involved contracts for
purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery and were thus
within the CFTC's jurisdiction. 10 8 After reviewing the legislative
history of the CFTC jurisdiction over foreign currencies and government securities, 10 9 the letter concluded:
106. Id. at 21,907.
107. The letter noted:
Notwithstanding the broad significance the "exclusive jurisdiction" provision may have for these and other purposes, however, we do not believe
that a person who, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, has failed
to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission by seeking or obtaining designation or registration should be permitted by any court to raise
the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction as a defense against alleged violations of other statutes. The exclusive jurisdiction provision was designed by
Congress to protect legitimate businessmen from duplicative regulation by
the various states and the federal government. In view of this purpose, a
person who has not submitted to the jurisdiction of this Commission is not
entitled to the protection the Commodity Exchange Act would otherwise
offer.
Id. at 21,908-09.
108. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12, CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,467 (Aug. 17, 1977).
109. The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry commented that it had
included
an amendment [to the House bill] to clarify that the provisions of the bill
are not applicable to trading in foreign currencies and certain enumerated
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We view these remarks by the Committee as an expression
that regulation by the Commission is unnecessary where there
exists an informal market among institutional participants in
transactions for future delivery in the specified financial instruments only so long as it is supervised by those agencies having
regulatory responsibility over those participants. However, where
that market is not supervised and where those transactions are
conducted with participation by members of the general public,
we do not understand the Committee to have intended that a
regulatory gap should exist. In these circumstances, we believe
the Commodity Exchange Act should be construed broadly to
assure that the public interest will be protected by Commission
regulation of those transactions.
Notwithstanding these considerations, on the basis of the
facts concerning your client's existing and proposed transactions
in GNMAs and Treasury Obligations as set forth in your letter,
particularly the lack of general public participation in the transactions, it may be reasonable to conclude, as you appear to have
concluded, that your client's transactions do not involve contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery traded or executed
on a board of trade. If you should be misinformed concerning
any material fact, however, for example, the lack of public participation in the transactions, a different conclusion may be required."10
This opinion emphasized that there was no regulatory vacuum
in the GNMA market and no general public participation in transactions in that market. The implication was that should either of
these factors change, the commitment market for GNMA certififinancial instruments unless such trading is conducted on a formally organized futures exchange. A great deal of trading in foreign currency in the

United States is carried out through an informal network of banks and tellers. The Committee believes that this market is more properly supervised

by the bank regulatory agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this
legislation is unnecessary.
Likewise, the Committee believes that regulation by the Commission of

transactions in the specified financial instruments (i.e., security warrants,
security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options,

government securities, mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments),
which generally are between banks and other sophisticated institutional participants, is unnecessary, unless executed on a formally organized futures
exchange.
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.

&

AD. NEws 5843, 5863-64, quoted in CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12, COMM.
FuTr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,467, at 21,912 (Aug. 17, 1977).
110. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12, COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,467, at 21,912 (Aug. 17, 1977).
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cates could be construed to be a futures market. In fact, the
GNMA commitment market is, essentially, unregulated. Moreover,
the market existed in this unregulated fashion at the time of the
1974 amendments, and there is no hint in the legislative history
that Congress intended the CFTC to regulate this market. The Interpretative Letter referred to a statement by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry which revealed the Senate's
intent that, unless traded "on a formally organized futures exchange," regulation of foreign currency was " 'more properly
supervised by the bank regulatory agencies and that, therefore,
regulation under this legislation is unnecessary.' "1I However,
when referring to government securities, the Committee indicated
its belief that " 'regulation by the Commission of transactions in
.. . government securities . . . which generally are between banks
and other sophisticated institutional participants, is unnecessary,
unless executed on a formally organized futures exchange.' "112
One may thus conclude that when the 1974 amendments to the
Act were adopted, it was known that this market was essentially
unregulated.
The second major element in the CFTC's opinion letter was
the concern with possible participation in the GNMA commitment
market by the general public. Although public participation in a
market is a legitimate concern of a regulatory agency charged with
protecting the public, and partially determines if something is a
futures contract, such participation has never been considered the
touchstone in defining a futures contract.
A CFTC Advisory Committee Report 1 3 analyzes the differences among futures contracts, forward contracts, and leverage
contracts. The analysis includes among the important characteristics of a futures contract that it (1) is traded publicly; (2) is priced
by open outcry; (3) is rarely settled by delivery; (4) is cleared
through a central clearinghouse; and (5) consists of uniform contract
terms.' 14 A forward market, such as the GNMA commitment mar111. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5863-64).
112. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12, COrMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)

20,467, at 21,912 (Aug. 17, 1977) (quoting S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23,
reprinted in [1974] U.S CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5863-64).

113. Report of the Advisory Committee on Market Instruments to the CFTC on
Recommended Policies on Futures, Forward and Leverage Contracts and Transactions (July 16, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMiM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,192.
114. See id. at 21,090.
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ket, in which delivery is the rule rather than the exception and in
which terms and conditions are privately negotiated, does not possess these established futures contract characteristics. These elements must always be analyzed to determine whether a commitment market is, in fact, a futures market.
CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12115 permits the GNMA
commitment market to exist without threat of immediate CFTC
intervention. However, the letter warns that should the public become more involved in trading commitments, the CFTC may examine the market to determine whether it is a futures market
under the Act.116
IV.

CASE LAW REGARDING CFTC
JURISDICTION

Few cases have discussed the parameters of the jurisdictional
and exclusive jurisdictional provisions of the Act, as amended by
the CFTC Act of 1974; most of the cases to date have involved transactions occurring prior to April 21, 1975, the effective date of the
1974 amendments. The specific issue raised in these cases was
whether the SEC or the states may bring an action, including an
injunction request, against violation of the securities laws as to the
sale, prior to April 21, 1975, of options on commodities for future
delivery and of "leverage contracts" in gold and silver. However,
the decisions, even on this narrow issue, have been inconsistent.
State v. Monex International,Ltd. 1 17 was an early decision involving this issue. In Monex International Texas sued to enjoin
Monex from selling "leverage contracts" which had not been registered under the state securities laws. The lower court held that
Monex was not selling securities within the meaning of the Texas
Securities Act and the state appealed. While that appeal was pending, the 1974 amendments became effective. The Texas Court of
115. Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,467 (Aug. 17, 1977).
116. Aside from the commodity law issues present in the GNMA commitment
market, this market is also faced with various securities law questions. For example,
whether either a mandatory commitment (a bilateral contract) or a standby commitment (an option) is a security apart from the GNMA security itself is an important
issue. If either commitment is held to be a separate security, it might be subject to
the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. For a general discussion of
some of the securities law problems present in the mortgage market, see Root &
Russo, Trading System for Mortgages Must Clear SEC Restrictions, in 2 SEC '74, at
105 (1974).
117. 527 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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Civil Appeals stated: "We think it is clear that the newly established Commodity Futures Trading Commission now has exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate [Monex's] margin account sales."" 8 In
Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Mouer,"1 9 the Supreme Court of Texas,
following Monex, held that the CFIrC's jurisdiction with respect to
London commodity options was exclusive and dismissed as moot
0
the state suit against the brokerage company.12
In SEC v. Univest, Inc.,12 ' the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held similarly. The SEC charged defendant
in Univest with violating the securities laws with respect to selling
London options on commodities for future delivery prior to April
21, 1975. While the SEC was investigating the case, but prior to
the time that it actually filed suit, the 1974 amendments became
effective. In Univest the court stated that "[t]his new statute,
which went into effect on April 21, 1975, serves to strip the SEC
of standing to bring this suit."' 122 Regarding section 412 of the 1974
amendments,' 2 3 the court stated that "[t]he fact is that this action
was not 'pending' prior to the effective date of the new statute....
[C]onsequently, the provisions of the new Act come into effect
1 24
with regard to the actions which led to the filing of this complaint.'
Subsequent cases, however, have not followed Monex, Clayton, or Univest. Indeed, in SEC v. Norton,' 2 5 the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, with facts similar to those in
Univest but without reference to its previous holding in that case,
held that the SEC had standing to sue. The court relied "on the
118. Id. at 807. The court reviewed the provisions of § 412 of the 1974 amendments, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88
Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a note (Supp. V 1975)), which provide that "[plending proceedings under existing law shall not be abated by reason of any provision
in this Act but shall be disposed of pursuant to the applicable provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, in effect prior to the effective date of this
Act." The court held: "Section 412 pertains to matters pending under the Commodity
Exchange Act before the 1974 amendments. Here, the State seeks to enjoin future
conduct on the part of [Monex] under the Texas Securities Act. Section 412 is not
applicable." State v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., 527 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
119. 531 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1975).
120. Id.
121. 405 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 76-1734 (7th Cir.
July 26, 1976).
122. Id. at 1058.
123. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
124. SEC v. Univest, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (N.D. Ill.
1975), appeal
docketed, No. 76-1734 (7th Cir. July 26, 1976).
125. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,204 (N.D.
Ill. 1976).
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House Report which clearly intended to leave undisturbed any
matters under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission at the effective date of the new Act in April, 1975."126
In State v. Coin Wholesalers, Inc., 127 the State of Minnesota
brought an action for violation of the state securities laws with respect to the sale, prior to April 21, 1975, of silver coins on margin,
constituting leverage contracts. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that defendant's margin sales were sales of securities, and
also sought a permanent injunction against such sales pursuant to
state securities laws. The lower court denied all the requested relief, with one exception: It declared the sale of silver coins on margin to be an "investment contract" and, hence, a security under
state securities laws. 12 8 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the Texas cases which had held that section 412 of
the 1974 amendments abated proceedings under state law. The
court emphasized, however, that those cases dealt with requests
for prospective injunctive relief under state blue sky laws. It affirmed the lower court decision, stating that the declaratory judgment action distinguished the instant case from the Texas cases:
"We are persuaded that § 412 was not intended to abate pending
actions under state law that seek remedies which, like declaratory judgments, are wholly retrospective. This construction in no
way impinges on the exclusively Federal jurisdiction over margins
sales after April 21, 1975 ..... 129
In SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, Inc., 130 defendants, prior to April 21, 1975, had engaged in transactions for options on commodities for future delivery which the SEC charged
had violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
The lower court issued permanent injunctions against violations of
the federal securities laws. Upon appeal, the issue before the
Tenth Circuit was whether the 1974 amendments to the Act excluded the SEC from any jurisdiction which it might otherwise have
had over the transactions in question. The court reviewed the
legislative history of the jurisdictional provisions, including statements by Senator Talmadge and Representative Poage, 131 and con126.
127.

Id. at 21,126-27.
CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)

20,407 (Minn. 1977).

128. Id. at 21,636 (discussing lower court decision).
129. Id. at 21,637.
130. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
Cir. 1976).

131.

20,238 (10th

On the floors of the Senate and the House, respectively, Senator Talmadge
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eluded:
Based on the history and the strong reasons of policy and
legislative logic, it is to be concluded that the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission retained jurisdiction to bring the suit
and that the trial court bad jurisdiction to entertain the case and
to grant the relief prayed for. This view is in harmony with the
legislative history. It carries out the Congressional intent to
avoid overlapping, but it does not create a void period during
1 32
which neither Commission can act.
In InternationalTrading Ltd. v. Bell, 133 a state appellate court
considered the relationship of CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to activities occurring subsequent to the effective date of the 1974 amendments. Appellants had been enjoined by the lower court under the
Arkansas Securities Act 134 from committing fraud in connection
with the sale of "London commodity options." The Supreme Court
of Arkansas reviewed the prior case law in this area and the legislative history of the Act. In response to the State Securities
Commissioner's argument that he should not be prevented from
enforcing the state securities regulatory scheme because the Arkansas Securities Act does not conflict with the federal act, the court
stated: "Where

.

. Congress has made it clear that authority con-

ferred by it is exclusive in a given area the states cannot exercise
concomitant or supplementary regulatory authority over the identical activity."' 35 The court found that, in view of the CFTC's excluand Representative Poage stated:
[AII pending proceedings, including ongoing investigations, as well as court
proceedings, should continue unabated by any provision of the Act. This
also is necessary in order to prevent the creation of any regulatory gaps
.... During the course of our deliberations, we learned, for example, that
the SEC has a number of such matters currently under investigation. We
would expect that those investigations will continue and any proceedings
resulting therefrom will not be affected by the passage of this Act.
120 CONG. REc. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Senator Talmadge); 120 CONG. REC.
34,737 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage), quoted in SEC v. American Commodity
Exch., Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT.L. REP. (CCH) 20,238 (10th
Cir. 1976).
132. SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
Comm.FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,238, at 21,272 (10th Cir. 1976).
133. CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,495 (Ark. Oct. 3, 1977).
134. ARK.STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1235 to 67-1263 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975).
135. International Trading Ltd. v. Bell, COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) f 20,495, at
21,996 (Ark. Oct. 3, 1977) (citations omitted). The court reviewed the preemption test
set forth in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), and concluded: "Although we would be compelled to answer the fourth question in the negative, if we consider only the terms of the Arkan-
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sive jurisdiction in this area, the lower court had no jurisdiction
under the Arkansas Securities Act and the State Securities Com136
missioner had no standing to bring the action.
Thus, courts have reached varying decisions on the issue of
whether the SEC or the states can sue under securities laws for
activities regarding the sale of commodity options or leverage contracts. There appears to be, however, a trend in the decisions indicating that, while the state and federal securities laws are applicable to commodity option and leverage contract sales activities occurring prior to the effective date of the 1974 amendments, the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction makes the securities laws inapplicable to such transactions occurring after that date.
V.

A PROPOSAL

The events leading to the adoption of the exclusive jurisdiction
provision of the 1974 amendments indicated the necessity for one
regulatory structure to deal with the growing problems and needs
of the commodities industry. Yet, notwithstanding the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction, states continue to propose and enforce substantive regulatory provisions regarding the commodities markets, and
there has been no agreement between the SEC and the CFTC as
to many aspects of the CFTC's exclusive authority.
The price of this uncertainty is the inability of the business
community to determine the proper legal course to follow. For example, there are no certain answers to whether a commodity pool
must abide by substantive state regulation governing such pools or
whether it must comply with the disclosure requirements of the
sas Securities Act as presently written, the potential for obstacles is just as important
as their existence. . . . Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulations could

change this answer. As to the other questions, our answers are in the affirmative. We
have already mentioned the legislative history and the broad scope of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act. There was at least a Congressional finding that
the nature of the subject matter demanded exclusive federal regulations and we cannot say that this finding was unfounded.... Even if we apply [the test articulated in
Northern States Power Co.], we find a strong implication that federal preemption
was intended." International Trading Ltd. v. Bell, COMM. F t. L. REP. (CCH)
20,495, at 21,996 (Ark. Oct. 3, 1977) (citations omitted).
136. The court stated that, although the state could not prosecute under the
Arkansas Securities Act, it could prosecute an offender under the state's Criminal
Code and that "[t]here is no bar of actions by persons [who had been] defrauded to
recover money [which had been] obtained from them by fraud. Such actions could
not constitute any realistic threat of interference with the federal regulatory scheme
and the act certainly does not afford protection of fraudulent conduct." International
Trading Ltd. v. Bell, CoMzi. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,495, at 21,996 (Ark. Oct. 3,
1977).
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federal securities laws. 1 37
Unfortunately, much of the difficulty in determining the
parameters of exclusive jurisdiction results from "turf-fighting" between public agencies. Prior to the adoption of the 1974 amendments, there was no agency with specific authority to regulate
many aspects of commodities trading. When public agencies confronted fraud or the potential for fraud in these unregulated areas,
they sought in their enabling legislation a nexus to the questioned
activity which would allow them to protect their constituency from
the perpetrators of fraud. The nexus in the securities field derived
from calling whatever is being sold a "security," or from requiring
disclosure of the fraud under the disclosure provisions of the securities laws.138 However, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
CFTC demonstrates the congressional intent that a single agency,
the CFTC, should regulate commodities markets. Thus, it should
no longer be necessary for other regulatory bodies to seek connections to their own regulatory systems for the purpose of regulating
these markets.
Nevertheless, the unresolved issues described in this article
demonstrate the lack of definitive guidelines for determining the
bounds of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. We suggest that a
"rule of reason" be used to determine who governs what. The elements of such a rule of reason must be derived from the intent of
Congress as revealed in section 2(a)(1). The fundamental congressional design was to avoid a duplicative or contradictory regulatory
structure. In the 1974 amendments, Congress sought to create one
federal agency with the expertise to regulate the commodities industry. In the numerous jurisdictional "gray areas," Congress' intent should be the touchstone in determining the scope of the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction.
For example, the SEC maintains that the disclosure provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933139 apply to commodity pools. At present, the CFTC has acquiesced in this contention by not objecting
137. Often, a commodity pool operator must decide whether to abide by substantive state regulations which may prove costly and which may limit the operations
of the pool, or not to comply because he believes the particular regulations are
within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction, thereby risking a costly lawsuit to prove
his point.
138. Perhaps the best example of the use of the disclosure provisions to remedy a more fundamental problem is the SEC's attempt to prevent bribes to foreign
officials by requiring disclosure of these bribes. See generally Note, Foreign Bribes
and the Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1976); 49
TEMP. L.Q. 428 (1976).
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
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to the application of such SEC disclosure provisions. Notwithstanding its acquiescence, the CFIC has proposed requiring commodity
pool operators to furnish a disclosure statement to prospective pool
participants on or before the date it solicits, accepts, or receives
funds from such participants. 140 The CFTC proposed its disclosure
requirements after reviewing SEC registration and equivalent state
requirements, and decided that certain aspects of federal and state
securities regulation, such as review of the disclosure statement by
the CFTC prior to the sale of interests in commodity pools, were
unnecessary. Because of the CFTC's expertise in understanding
commodity pools and its expert judgment of how much disclosure
and governmental review best protect the public, it contradicts the
rule of reason to permit another public agency lacking this "commodities expertise" to regulate this area. In addition, the enforcement of disclosure provisions by different regulatory bodies will be
duplicative where such provisions overlap, and will be contradictory where the regulatory decisions are at cross-purposes.
In view of the congressional concern with duplicative and contradictory regulation, the CFTC's expertise in the commodities
area, and the equivalency of the CFTC's proposal to existing federal and state securities law regulation, a rule of reason resolution
of this jurisdictional "gray area" favors the exclusive jurisdiction of
the CFrC. 14 1 If used by the various regulatory bodies and the
courts, the rule of reason can resolve many of the jurisdictional
issues described in this article. Alternatively, Congress should
clarify its intent in unambiguous language, so that contradictory
and duplicative regulation, costly both to the commodities industry
and to the public, can be avoided.
140. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
141. A rule of reason resolution would be necessary only where it is unclear
whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision is applicable. However, it can be argued
with respect to the capital formation stage of a commodity pool, that the issue is one
that could be resolved by the language of § 2(a)(1). In an Interpretative Letter, the
CFTC Office of General Counsel stated that the "relationships between commodity
trading pools and their participants are, from their inception, quite literally, 'accounts, agreements . . .[or] transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity
for future delivery .... "' CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-14, COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,486, at 21,975 (Sept. 16, 1977). Indeed, Congress was aware that the
"inception" of a pool includes its capital formation. It defined a commodity pool
operator as "any person engaged in a business which is of the nature of an investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or property, either
directly or through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or otherwise,for the purpose of tradingin any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market ... 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V
1975) (emphasis added).
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